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ABSTRACT 
 
Three appellate decisions illustrate the difficulty of 
acquiring trademark protection for domain names that 
include a top-level domain (“TLD”), such as “.com.” 
Courts have characterized these marks as generic or 
merely descriptive, which carries implications for the party 
seeking registration: generic marks cannot be protected, 
while descriptive marks can, assuming they possess a 
secondary meaning that makes the mark distinctive. 
Generic and descriptive domain names often indicate the 
services a company provides, with the addition of the 
“.com” TLD to indicate online services. One key test of 
genericness is whether the public identifies the mark with a 
service generally or with a company specifically. This 
Article examines the rationales supporting the generic-
descriptive distinction for domain names with TLDs. When 
a website does more than merely sell a product online that 
could be obtained in a brick and mortar store—such as 
providing additional consumer tools and flexibility unique 
to the online medium—the domain name has an increased 
chance of being viewed as descriptive and potentially 
protectable.  
                                                                                                             
* Luke M. Rona, University of Washington School of Law, Class of 2012. 
While any defects in this note are completely my own, I would like to thank 
Professor Rafael I. Pardo for his thoughtful comments and support throughout 
the research and writing process. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Several recent federal appeals court opinions have denied 
federal trademark protection to online domain names such as 
“STEELBUILDING.COM,” “MATTRESS.COM,” and 
“ADVERTISE.COM,” citing their generic nature or lack of 
descriptiveness.1 In the process, the courts have blurred the 
distinction between generic and merely descriptive marks. Generic 
terms that describe what the service is, instead of who provides the 
service, rarely gain protection through the addition of the top-level 
domain (“TLD”) “.com” as part of a domain name. Generic marks 
cannot be registered under trademark law. Descriptive marks must 
                                                                                                             
1 See In re Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d 1293, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2005); In re 
1800MATTRESS.COM IP, LLC, 586 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2009); 
Advertise.com, Inc. v. AOL Advertising, Inc., 616 F.3d 974, 982 (9th Cir. 
2010). 
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have a secondary meaning that identifies the source of the service, 
as recognized by the consuming public, for possible federal 
trademark protection. The addition of a TLD does not enhance the 
potential trademark protection of generic or descriptive domain 
names, but the possibility of new TLDs such as “.sports” or “.law” 
will present new frontiers for possible trademark registration. 
This Article provides a brief overview of trademark 
distinctiveness and standards of review, and then examines the 
rationales behind three federal appellate court decisions, including 
two registration appeals and one trademark infringement appeal. 
Next, the Article attempts to synthesize what factors a court might 
consider when categorizing a domain name as generic or 
descriptive. Finally, the Article considers the recent announcement 
that the universe of TLDs will soon be expanded significantly.  
 
I. TRADEMARK DISTINCTIVENESS OVERVIEW 
 
Marks are generally classified in one of four categories: 
generic, descriptive, suggestive, or arbitrary/fanciful.2 These “lines 
of demarcation, however, are not always bright,” and a “term may 
shift from one category to another in light of differences in usage 
through time.”3 
A generic term is one that “refers, or has come to be 
understood as referring, to the genus of which the particular 
product is a species.”4 A generic term, by definition, identifies a 
type of product, not the source of the product.5 Generic terms are 
not entitled to legal protection.6 A generic term “cannot function as 
an indicator of the source of a product . . . because the relevant 
                                                                                                             
2 Abercrombie & Fitch, Co., v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 
1976). 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 In re Gould Paper Corp., 834 F.2d 1017, 1018 (Fed. Cir. 1987); see also 
Thomas L. Casagrande, Of Lawyers, Hotels, and Mattresses: The Federal 
Circuit’s Ever-expanding Genericness Test for [Thing].com Marks, 3.1 
LANDSLIDE, Sept./Oct. 2010, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/ 
migrated/intelprop/magazine/LANDSLIDE_Sept2010_Casagrande.authcheckda
m.pdf. 
6 Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 9.  
3
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public understands the term primarily as the common name for the 
product.”7 As distinguished from descriptive marks, generic terms 
cannot be saved even by proof of secondary meaning.8 Courts 
deny trademark protection for generic marks because a trademark 
cannot deprive competing manufacturers of “the right to call an 
article by its name.”9  
A non-generic mark that is deemed “merely descriptive,” 
because it describes a good or service, will likewise not receive 
trademark protection.10 Protecting merely descriptive marks would 
“confer a monopoly not only of the mark but of the product by 
rendering a competitor unable effectively to name what it was 
endeavoring to sell.”11 Yet descriptive marks may qualify for 
registration if they acquire “secondary meaning,” or 
distinctiveness.12 To show that a mark has acquired distinctiveness, 
the applicant must demonstrate that “the relevant public 
understands the primary significance of the mark as identifying the 
source of a product or service rather than the product or service 
itself.”13  
The third category, “suggestive” marks, is difficult to define. 
One court observed that a term is suggestive if it requires 
“imagination, thought, and perception to reach a conclusion as to 
the nature of the goods.”14 Judge Learned Hand remarked, “the 
validity of the mark ends where suggestion ends and description 
begins.”15 “If a term is suggestive, it is entitled to trademark 
                                                                                                             
7 In re Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d 1293, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing In re 
Dial-A-Mattress, 240 F.3d 1341, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). 
8 Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 9.  
9 Id. (citing J. Kohnstam, Ltd. v. Louis Marx and Co., 280 F.2d 437 
(C.C.P.A. 1960)).  
10 Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 10.  
11 Id. 
12 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (2006); Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 
U.S. 763, 769 (1992). 
13 In re Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d 1293, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing 
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 163 (1995)).  
14 Stix Products, Inc. v. United Merchants & Manufacturers Inc., 295 F. 
Supp. 479, 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). 
15 Franklin Knitting Mills, Inc. v. Fashionit Sweater Mills, Inc., 297 F. 247, 
248 (2d Cir. 1923), aff’d per curiam, 4 F.2d 1018 (2d Cir. 1925).  
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protection without proof of secondary meaning.”16 If the U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) registers a mark without 
requiring proof of secondary meaning, there is “a rebuttable 
presumption that the mark is suggestive or arbitrary/fanciful, 
instead of merely descriptive.”17  
“Arbitrary” or “fanciful” terms enjoy the trademark protection 
of suggestive terms, but are not subject to a “merely descriptive” 
analysis.18 Fanciful, as a “classifying concept,” is “usually applied 
to words invented solely for their use as trademarks.”19 Arbitrary 
categorization can apply to common words used in an unfamiliar 
way.20 For example, “Apple” is an arbitrary mark for a company 
that makes computers.21 
 
II. REGISTRATION/APPEALS PROCESS AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
A.  Trademark Registration Appeals 
 
The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“TTAB”) makes 
factual determinations of whether an asserted mark is generic.22 
The TTAB is an administrative adjudicative body that hears 
appeals from final registration decisions of trademark examiners.23 
To deny the registration of a mark as generic, the USPTO has the 
burden of “substantially showing . . . that the matter is in fact 
generic . . . based on clear evidence of generic use.”24  
When a plaintiff receives a federal trademark registration from 
the USPTO, she is entitled to a presumption that the mark is 
                                                                                                             
16 Abercrombie & Fitch, Co., v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 11 (2d 
Cir. 1976). 
17 Id. 
18 Id.  
19 Id. at n.12. 
20 Id. 
21 See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. McNeil-P.P.C., Inc., 973 F.2d 1033, 
1041 (2d Cir. 1992) (citing 1 J.T. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 11:22, at 498-99 (2d ed. 1984)).  
22 In re Pennington Seed, Inc., 466 F.3d 1053, 1056 (Fed. Cir. 2006).  
23 15 U.S.C. § 1070 (West 2010); see also Casagrande, supra note 5.  
24 In re Am. Fertility Soc’y, 188 F.3d 1341, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (quoting 
In re Merrill Lynch, Fenner and Smith, Inc., 828 F.2d 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1987) 
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valid.25 Once registered, the trademark owner has the exclusive 
right to use the mark in commerce in connection with the goods or 
services specified in registration.26 This presumption of validity 
can be rebutted with a showing by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the mark is not protectable.27  
The Federal Circuit has appellate jurisdiction over TTAB’s 
registration decisions.28 The Federal Circuit reviews the TTAB’s 
legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for substantial 
evidence.29 Substantial evidence is defined as “more than a mere 
scintilla” and “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind would 
accept as adequate” to support a conclusion.30  
 
B.  Trademark Infringement Appeal 
 
A federal court of appeals reviews a district court’s ruling on a 
matter of law under the de novo standard.31 Whether “secondary 
meaning” exists is reviewed under the “clearly erroneous” 
standard.32 To prevail on an infringement claim, the plaintiff must 
demonstrate (1) rights in a mark, (2) priority in the mark over the 
defendant’s rights, and (3) a “likelihood of confusion” as a result 
of the offending mark. “Likelihood of confusion” is a mixed 
question of law and fact, which is reviewed under the “clearly 
erroneous” standard.33 
                                                                                                             
25 555-1212.com, Inc. v. Comm. House Int’l, Inc., 157 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 
1088 (N.D. Cal. 2001); see 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b) (West 2010).  
26 555-1212.com, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 1088.  
27 See Vuitton Et Fils S.A. v. J. Young Enterprises, Inc., 644 F.2d 769, 776 
(9th Cir. 1981).  
28 15 U.S.C. § 1071(a)(1) (2010).  
29 In re Pacer Tech., 338 F.3d 1348, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
30 Id. (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).  
31 Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc., 778 F.2d 1352, 1355 (9th Cir. 
1985).  
32 Id. 
33 Id. (“Likelihood of confusion is the type of mixed question which fits 
within the categories suggested in McConney as suited to clearly erroneous 
review—cases not implicating constitutional rights and those ‘in which the 
applicable legal standard provides for a strictly factual test, such as state of 
mind.’”) (citing United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195 (9th Cir.) (en banc), 
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 824 (1984)). 
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III. STEELBUILDING.COM: DESCRIPTIVE, BUT LACKING 
SECONDARY MEANING 
 
Businesses operating online face significant challenges when 
trying to gain trademark protection for their domain names. Many 
commercial websites allow consumers to access inventory or 
services available in brick and mortar stores. Some businesses, 
however, use the Internet as a vehicle to offer additional services 
unique to the online forum. The Steelbuilding court confronted 
whether a domain name could be trademarked for a business that 
involved the development and construction of steel buildings, but 
also allowed its customers to design and view their buildings in an 
online environment.34 The Federal Circuit vacated the TTAB 
determination that the mark “STEELBUILDING.COM” was 
generic, but affirmed the TTAB’s finding that the mark is merely 
descriptive without secondary meaning, and thereby denied 
trademark protection.35  
 
A.  Generic Mark Test 
 
To determine whether the mark was generic, the court applied 
a two-prong test: first, the court determined the “genus” of goods 
or services at issue; second, the court analyzed whether the term 
sought to be registered is understood by the relevant public 
“primarily to refer to that genus of goods or services.”36  
The court first determined what core services the business 
provided. The company sold steel building materials online, but it 
also provided services that extended beyond mere sales: users 
could design and purchase their own unique buildings online.37 Its 
online catalogue permitted users to determine an appropriate price 
for their building designs, facilitating users’ construction of their 
buildings in a flexible and fluid online environment.38 Importantly, 
                                                                                                             
34 In re Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
35 Id. at 1296. 
36 Id. at 1296-97 (citing H. Marvin Ginn Corp. v. Int’l Ass’n of Fire Chiefs, 
782 F.2d 987, 990 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).  
37 Id. at 1298. 
38 Id. 
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the court noted that the website was more than a “shopping guide” 
that listed materials and prices.39 As a “STEELBUILDING.COM” 
user developed a building design online, the program 
“recalculate[d] design elements as necessary to meet codes and 
other engineering requirements.”40 What the website really offered 
was a software program that helped users meet economic, 
regulatory, and aesthetic constraints.41 Potential purchasers could 
compare prices of different designs and decide which one best fit 
their needs.42 
The Federal Circuit determined that the TTAB failed to 
acknowledge “the interactive design feature of the applicant’s 
goods and services.”43 As such, the court concluded the TTAB 
misunderstood the proper genus for “STEELBUILDING.COM,” 
having defined it as “the sale of pre-engineered ‘steel buildings’ on 
the Internet.”44 Sale of steel buildings was a significant component 
of the service, but so was the interactive design feature of the 
website.45 This mischaracterization of the genus required the 
Federal Circuit to vacate the TTAB’s decision to deny registration 
on generic grounds.46 
 
B.  Examining the Entire Mark, Including the TLD 
 
The Federal Circuit also reviewed the TTAB’s analysis of the 
compound word “steelbuilding” and its bifurcation of 
“STEELBUILDING.COM” into two separate marks: the 
compound word “steelbuilding” and the TLD indicator “.com.” In 
a previous case, the Federal Circuit observed that trademark 
registration could be denied where there was substantial evidence 
of “separate words joined to form a compound [that has] a 
meaning identical to the meaning common usage would ascribe to 
                                                                                                             
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 1298. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 1297.  
44 Id. at 1298. 
45 Id.  
46 Id. 
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those words as a compound.”47 The court referenced the attempted 
registration of “screenwipe” for a product defined by the applicant 
as a “wipe” for “screens”—the mark was rejected because the 
terms “remain[ed] as generic in compound as individually.”48 Yet 
here, the record did not show that “steelbuilding,” as a compound 
word, meant the same thing as the generic words “steel” and 
“building.”49 No dictionary definitions or other sources suggested 
that joining the separate words “steel” and “building” would create 
a generic word.50 The Federal Circuit therefore held that the TTAB 
did not sufficiently weigh the ambiguities and multiple meanings 
of the composite word.51 In other words, “steelbuilding” could be 
more than just a composite noun of the adjective “steel” and noun 
“building.” Instead, “steelbuilding” could function as a verb, fitting 
the unique services provided on the website: it allowed users to 
“steelbuild.”  
Second, the court found the TTAB did not adequately consider 
the entire mark including the TLD indicator. The Federal Circuit 
acknowledged the general rule that only in “rare instances” will the 
addition of a TLD indicator to a descriptive term operate to create 
a distinctive mark.52 The TLD must still be weighed, however, as 
the addition of “.com” added meaning to the mark because it 
showed “Internet-related distinctiveness, intimating some ‘Internet 
feature.’”53 The TLD “.com” expanded the mark to “include 
Internet services that include ‘building’ or designing steel 
structures on the website and then calculating the appropriate price 
before ordering the unique structure.”54 Again, the possible usage 
of “steelbuilding” as a verb denoting online services defeated 
denial of registration on generic grounds.  
 
                                                                                                             
47 In re Gould Paper Corp., 834 F.2d 1017, 1018 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 
48 Id. at 1019.  
49 Steelbuilding, 415 F.3d at 1299.  
50 Id. at 1298-99. 
51 Id. 
52 In re Oppedahl & Larson LLP, 373 F.3d 1171, 1175 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
53 Id. at 1175-76.  
54 Steelbuilding, 834 F.3d at 1299.  
9
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C.  “STEELBUILDING.COM” Is Merely Descriptive 
 
Although the Federal Circuit vacated the generic analysis of 
the TTAB, it held that the record showed 
“STEELBUILDING.COM” was merely descriptive of the online 
services provided and devoid of secondary meaning.55 Based on 
evidence from features listed on the website and in the applicant’s 
own advertisements, the Federal Circuit agreed with the TTAB’s 
conclusion that the sale of steel buildings was a significant feature 
of the applicant’s services.56 Considering the impact of the TLD 
indicator, the Federal Circuit concluded that adding “.com” simply 
identified that the services were provided in an online 
environment.57 In terms of descriptiveness, the record showed that 
a consumer would recognize the compound word “steelbuilding” 
as indistinguishable from the phrase “steel buildings,” meriting 
denial of registration.58 The burden for showing the mark had 
acquired secondary meaning was on the applicant, whose 
advertising efforts and name recognition polling failed to show the 
mark had acquired distinctiveness.59 
Ultimately, the Federal Circuit was not convinced that 
“steelbuilding” sufficiently led consumers to think of the specific 
applicant’s business. The dissenting opinion argued that the 
domain name was more than a mere address, and that recognition 
of the domain name was potentially a form of source 
identification.60 In other words, the domain name would be 
distinctive as it communicated information regarding the source or 
the sponsor of the site. The dissent argued the TTAB did not 
                                                                                                             
55 Id. at 1300.  
56 Id. at 1299.  
57 Id. at 1300.  
58 Id. The possibility of a “double entendre” must be validated by consumer 
appreciation of such an interpretation. The Federal Circuit would later use 
similar language in discussing “MATTRESS.COM,” observing that Dial-A-
Mattress “presented no evidence that the relevant public finds such a double 
entendre.” In re 1800Mattress.com IP, LLC, 586 F.3d 1359,1364 (Fed. Cir. 
2009). However, it is unclear how “mattress” could have ever been construed to 
contain a double entendre. 
59 Steelbuilding, 834 F.3d at1300-01.  
60 Id. at 1301.  
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properly weigh the advertising efforts and other evidence of 
customer recognition.61 Instead of affirming, the dissent would 
have remanded to consider evidence that individuals viewed 
“STEELBUILDING.COM” as a source identifying the company, 
not just the product.62 
 
IV. IN RE 1800MATRESS.COM: A SIMPLER CASE OF  
GENERICNESS 
 
Four years later, the Federal Circuit affirmed the TTAB’s 
denial of registration for a domain name purely on grounds that the 
name was generic.63 In its evaluation of “MATTRESS.COM,” the 
court did not entertain the possibility of a descriptive category or 
secondary meaning.64  
The TTAB found that the genus of the mark was online retail 
store services in the field of mattresses, beds, and bedding.65 
Reasoning that “MATTRESS.COM” would be understood by the 
relevant public primarily to refer to that genus, it was a generic 
term that could never be trademarked.66 The addition of “.com” did 
not affect registrability because it did not create any additional 
meaning.67 The TTAB did consider whether further services were 
offered online, but maintained that “even if the term 
‘MATTRESS.COM’ might have significance for a different set of 
services [from those offered at a] brick and mortar store, [it was] 
irrelevant to whether the term was perceived by the public as 
naming the genus of services for which registration is sought, i.e., 
online mattress stores.”68 Public perception, even if incorrect, 
affected the TTAB’s generic categorization. 
The Federal Circuit agreed that “MATTRESS.COM” was 
                                                                                                             
61 Id. at 1302.  
62 Id. at 1302-03.  
63 1800Mattress, 586 F.3d at 1362-63.  
64 Id. at 1364.  
65 Id. at 1361. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 1362. 
11
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generic based on how the relevant public understood the term.69 
The court proceeded to analyze the two components of the mark, 
“mattress” and the TLD “.com,” and concluded that 
“MATTRESS.COM,” as understood by the relevant public, was no 
more than the “sum of its constituent parts, viz., an online provider 
of mattresses.”70 Dictionary definitions and other domain names 
influenced the court’s decision. The Federal Circuit had recently 
affirmed the TTAB’s denial of a trademark for “hotels.com,” 
noting that the TTAB gave “controlling weight to the large number 
of similar uses of ‘hotels’ with a dot-com suffix, as well as the 
common meaning and dictionary definition of ‘hotels’ and the 
standard usage of ‘.com’ to show a commercial internet domain.”71 
In this case, even if some of the other websites containing 
“MATTRESS.COM” in their domain names did not actually sell 
mattresses online, the fact that many of them did conduct online 
sales supported the TTAB’s conclusion that the marks are of the 
same genus.72 Consumers would then immediately associate 
“MATTRESS.COM” with a commercial website rendering retail 
services for mattresses, which is generic.73 
The court disagreed with the applicant’s contention that 
“MATTRESS.COM” evoked the quality of comfort in mattresses 
and maintained that the mark is not a mnemonic.74 Unlike the 
possible play on words in Steelbuilding, there was no evidence that 
the relevant public found a double entendre in the term 
“MATTRESS.COM.”75 Quoting Steelbuilding, the Federal Circuit 
reiterated that only in “rare instances will the addition of a TLD 
indicator to a descriptive term operate to create a distinctive 
mark.”76 Since the court was not engaging in an analysis of 
“MATTRESS.COM” as a descriptive term, it is unclear why the 
court felt it necessary to emphasize this point. There was no 
                                                                                                             
69 Id. 
70 1800Mattress, 586 F.3d at 1363.  
71 In re Hotels.com, 573 F.3d 1300, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
72 1800Mattress, 586 F.3d at 1364. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. (citing Steelbuilding, 415 F.3d 1293, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).  
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evidence that the “.com” TLD evoked anything but a commercial 
Internet domain.77 As such, the mark was denied trademark 
protection on genericness grounds.  
 
V. ADVERTISE.COM: GENERIC CATEGORIZATION 
IN AN INFRINGEMENT CASE 
 
The registrability of a domain name has also been analyzed in a 
trademark infringement case. The Ninth Circuit recently addressed 
trademark protection of AOL’s “ADVERTISING.COM,” 
concluding that the district court incorrectly determined that the 
mark was descriptive.78 The district court had granted a 
preliminary injunction against Advertise.com on the basis that 
“ADVERTISING.COM” was a valid descriptive mark.79 
Advertise.com appealed on the grounds that AOL’s 
“ADVERTISING.COM” mark was generic.80 
The Ninth Circuit reiterated that “[c]ontext is critical to a 
distinctiveness analysis . . . [and the level of distinctiveness of a 
mark] can be determined only by reference to the goods or services 
that [the mark] identifies.”81 In this case, the parties did not dispute 
that the genus of “ADVERTISING.COM” was “online 
advertising” or “Internet advertising.”82 The Ninth Circuit looked 
at the impression conveyed by “advertising” and “.com,”83 as well 
as how “ADVERTISING.COM” was understood by the 
consuming public.84 Taken separately, the words are clearly 
generic.85 But that did not mean the combined mark was generic. 
In an effort to clarify the distinction between generic and 
descriptive marks, the court returned to its “familiar” test, asking 
                                                                                                             
77 Id. 
78 Advertise.com, Inc. v. AOL Advertising, Inc., 616 F.3d 974, 977-78 (9th 
Cir. 2010). 
79 Id. at 976.  
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 977 (citing Lahoti v. VeriCheck, Inc., 586 F.3d 1190, 1201 (9th Cir. 
2009)).  
82 Id.  
83 Id. at 977-78. 
84 Id. at 977-78. 
85 Id.  
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“Who are you/What are you?”86 In order to gain trademark 
protection, a descriptive mark must answer “the buyer’s questions, 
‘Who are you? Where do you come from? Who vouches for 
you?’”87 In contrast, “a [generic] name of the product answers the 
question, ‘What are you?’”88 For “advertise.com,” dictionary 
definitions strongly suggested that the term was generic.89 Similar 
to Federal Circuit precedent, the court acknowledged that the 
addition of “.com” to a mark generally does not strengthen the 
mark.90 AOL’s analogy to Steelbuilding was inapposite: 
Steelbuilding represented the rare instance where further meaning 
was acquired once the “.com” was added.91 But here, the services 
offered under “ADVERTISING.COM” “remain[ed], at core, the 
simple provision of online advertising services.”92  
Furthermore, Advertise.com, the appellant, pointed to 32 
separate domain names that incorporated some version of the terms 
“advertising.com.”93 Providing trademark protection would have 
made it much more difficult for such companies to describe their 
services.94 Generic marks cannot be trademarked because 
competitors would be foreclosed from using a “vast array of 
simple, easy to remember domain names and designations that 
describe the services provided.”95 Nevertheless, the court stated 
that it was not creating a “per se rule against the use of domain 
names, even ones formed by combining generic terms with TLDs, 
as trademarks.”96 
 
                                                                                                             
86 Id. at 978. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. (citing Filipino Yellow Pages, Inc., v. Asian Journal Publ’ns Inc., 198 
F.3d 1143, 1147 (9th Cir. 1999)). 
89 Advertise, 616 F.3d at 977-78. 
90 Id. at 979 (citing Brookfield Commc’ns v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 
F.3d 1036, 1055 (9th Cir. 1999)). 
91 Id.  
92 Id. 
93 Id. at 980. 
94 Id. at 981. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 982.  
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VI. CASE LAW SYNTHESIS: VERBS, DOUBLE ENTENDRES, AND 
CONSUMER PERCEPTION 
 
Steelbuilding stands out as the one recent case where two 
generic words combined into a compound, coupled with a TLD 
indicator, almost created a descriptive mark. The failed marks in 
1800Mattress and Advertise were generic single words that failed 
to create a distinctive mark when joined with a TLD. While it is 
difficult to say that a standard for the descriptiveness of domain 
names as trademarks has emerged in the federal courts, several 
factors seem to increase the likelihood that a court will categorize a 
domain name as descriptive.  
First, melding two generic words into a compound word 
creates the possibility of new meaning that could distinctly identify 
the company behind the goods or services provided, thereby 
satisfying the “Who are you?” test. Steelbuilding linked an 
adjective with a noun to create a composite verb, such that the 
Federal Circuit looked not only at the possibility of selling steel 
buildings, but alternatively, the actual construction of steel 
buildings in an online environment. The two words potentially 
functioned as a verb, thereby moving the mark from purely generic 
into possibly descriptive.  
Second, where a possible double entendre exists, it is much less 
likely that the mark will be termed generic, and this likelihood 
decreases further when two generic words are spliced together. The 
mark in Steelbuilding could have been viewed as an adjective and 
noun or one compound verb, depending on how the words were 
interpreted. It is much more difficult for this kind of layered 
meaning to emerge from a single word like “mattress” or 
“advertising,” which largely remain confined to one part of speech.  
Third, there must be evidence of consumer perception of the 
company itself, not merely the umbrella genus of the goods or 
services provided. This remains true even if two words are linked 
to form a new word that is not necessarily generic. Despite the 
dissent’s objections, Steelbuilding failed this test, because its 
advertising, polling, repeat customers, and other evidence did not 
convince the court that consumers were targeting the company 
itself instead of the genus of services. A double entendre was 
possible, but there was no evidence that consumers actually 
15
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considered the mark as a verb.  
Fourth, should there be a multitude of other domain names 
incorporating the same generic word and the same genus of goods 
or services, courts will look less favorably on the potential 
distinctiveness of the mark. This is best exemplified in Advertise, 
where giving trademark protection to AOL’s mark would have 
precluded many other companies from using the most logical and 
immediate term to describe the services offered on their websites. 
The Ninth Circuit did not believe that when consumers visited 
“ADVERTISING.COM” they were specifically seeking AOL’s 
advertising services.  
Fifth, the addition of the TLD “.com” only adds potential 
distinctiveness if there is a uniquely interactive, online element to 
the goods or services provided over the Internet. The mere sale of 
goods or services on a website does not distinguish the mark from 
goods or services available in a brick and mortar store. 
Steelbuilding allowed consumers to do things online that they 
could not do in stores: there were creative elements of design that 
made the creation of the building more like solving an economic 
puzzle.  
Nevertheless, none of the marks in Steelbuilding, 
1800Mattress, or Advertise were afforded trademark protection. 
What is significant is that “MATTRESS.COM” and 
“ADVERTISING.COM” were found to be generic, meaning that 
they could never be registered. In contrast, should 
“STEELBUILDING.COM” eventually acquire secondary meaning 
that satisfies a court that the mark identifies the company itself, not 
merely the product offered, it could become a federally registered 
mark. 
 
VII. NEW FRONTIERS: “.SPORTS” AND BEYOND 
 
Upcoming expansion of TLDs will provide new trademark 
opportunities for companies seeking to register of domain names.97 
                                                                                                             
97 See generally Eric Nuhl & Dennis S. Prahl, The New Generic Top-Level 
Domain Program: A New Era of Risk for Trademark Owners and the Internet, 
101 TRADEMARK REP. 1757 (2011). 
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On June 20, 2011, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Number 
and Names (ICANN) held a landmark vote to allow new domain 
endings in addition to common endings such as “.com,” “.org,” 
“.gov,” and “.edu.”98 Prior to the vote, there were 22 available 
TLDs.99 But soon, “people will be able to apply to ICANN to 
register most any word, in any language, as their domain 
ending.”100 Applications will cost at least $185,000, suggesting 
that the TLDs will be primarily for large corporations and 
governments.101  
How this development will affect trademark registration is 
unclear, but it certainly opens up new possibilities. While the 
insertion of a generic noun TLD such as “MATRESS.BEDS” may 
be no more distinctive than “MATTRESS.COM,” a TLD like 
“STEELBUILDING.DESIGN” might push the mark into the 
descriptive category because a specific company’s additional 
online services would be highlighted by the TLD. Most companies, 
of course, will not have the financial resources to purchase such a 
specific TLD. But the availability of a more targeted TLD may 
create new opportunities for larger companies to trademark domain 
names that may have previously been deemed generic. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Recent trademark domain name cases demonstrate that courts 
are reluctant to view marks that are logically related to the genus of 
the goods or services provided as anything but generic. Should the 
mark contain a compound word with additional meaning beyond 
its constituent parts, a double entendre, consumer recognition, 
minimal overlap with other domain names, or an online, interactive 
element, the likelihood of registrability as a descriptive mark 
increases. The courts have not ruled out the possibility of a 
descriptive domain name gaining distinctiveness to the point where 
                                                                                                             
98 Doug Gross, Explaining the Internet's New Domain Endings, CNN.COM 
(June 20, 2011), http://articles.cnn.com/2011-06-20/tech/domain.names. 
explainer_1_icann-domain-names-internet-corporation?_s=PM:TECH.  
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
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it is protectable.  
The possibility of new generic TLDs creates further avenues 
for distinctiveness (such as if the TLD suggests the unique online 
services provided), but ultimately, if the TLD remains generic, the 
same problems arise when trying to pass the “Who are you?” test. 
A more dynamic universe of TLDs, however, provides further 
opportunities for the creation of distinctive verbs, wordplay, and 
double entendres, and the creation of a descriptive mark. 
Ultimately, if providers of online goods or services desire a 
registrable mark, they will want to move into the arbitrary/fanciful 
category. Should they insist on a word that relates to the genus of 
their goods or services, Steelbuilding and other recent cases 
provide some guidance for shifting the court’s lens from the 
generic to the descriptive, but also suggest caution regarding the 
likelihood of success.  
 
PRACTICE POINTERS 
 
 Because courts of appeals do not apply a bright line rule when 
reviewing whether a domain name is generic or descriptive, 
there is a premium on establishing a fact-intensive record at the 
trial-court level. These types of cases are won on the facts.  
 The importance of building a factual record is reinforced by the 
relevant standards of review, which are deferential to the 
factual findings of the TTAB (“substantial evidence” standard) 
or the trial court (“clearly erroneous” standard). 
 The prospect of new, diverse TLDs increases the possibility 
that a domain name could acquire trademark protection, but 
this remains an unexplored frontier.  
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